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ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 78-2a-3 (2) (h) and (j), Utah
Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Mr. Mitchell, the defendant/appellee, upon a finding that, as a matter of law, the
undisputed material facts, and that the case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,
767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), was controlling, he was entitled to an order
dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition to modify the parties' decree of divorce.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court need not defer to the
trial court's ruling, but only inquire into whether the trial court erred in applying
the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that that there were
no disputed issues of material fact. Ron Shepherd Ins., v. Shields, 883 P.2d 650,
654 (Utah 1994).
The issue was preserved in the trial court by Mrs. Foulger's objection to
the Domestic Relation Commissioner's recommendation. (R. at pp. 111-13)
2. Whether Mr. Mitchell should be awarded his costs and attorney fees
incurred in defending against Mrs. Foulger's claims, including this appeal. Mr.
Mitchell submits that there is no legal or factual basis for Mrs. Foulger's appeal.
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A trial court's decision to deny fees is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. Jorgensen 's v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 11, % 11. The
trial court's broad discretion in determining fees will be considered against an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. In addition, attorney fees may be awarded in
a case bringing a frivolous appeal, Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App. 110, \ 14.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Mr. Mitchell's motion for
summary judgment. (Appellee's Addendum attached hereto.) Attorney fees on
appeal may be awarded pursuant to the provisions of rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an award of attorney fees if the
appeal is frivolous.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The Appellee submits that there are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations before the Court whose inlerpretation is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE O F CASE, COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION BELOW

1. On or about January 29th, 2001, Mrs. Foulger filed a Petition to modify
the Decree of Divorce that dissolved the marriage between her and Mr. Mitchell.
-2-

This Petition alleges that she is now totally disabled and requested that the court
modify the original divorce decree to award her an interest in Mr. Mitchell's
retirement benefits. (R. at pp. 45-50)
2. Mr. Mitchell filed, on March 13 , 2001, a motion for a summary
judgment, arguing that the Utah case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d
121 (Utah App. 1988) was controlling in the instant case; and that, accordingly,
the petition to modify the divorce decree as requested by Mrs. Foulger should be
dismissed. (R. at pp. 58-59; Appellee's Addendum, attached hereto.)
3. The motion for summary judgment was argued before Commissioner
tin

Thomas N. Amett on April 26 , 2001.

Thereafter, the Commissioner

recommended that Mr. Mitchell's motion be granted. (R. at pp. 110, 134-35)
4. Mrs. Foulger objected to the Commissioner's recommendation. (R. at
pp.111-13)
5. On July 17 , the trial court, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck presiding,
heard argument on Mrs. Foulger's objection, overruled it, and affirmed the entry
of the summary judgment. The trial court's ruling was entered as an order on
August 1st, 2001. (R. at pp. 140, 148-49)
6. This instant appeal was initiated on August 8,2001. (R. at pp. 151-52)

-3-

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. These parties were divorced on October 3, 1977. (R. at p. 30)
2. Pursuant to the original divorce decree, Mrs. Mitchell was awarded the
marital home, all of the parties' personal property, except one single bed, a
portable television set, enough linens, bedcoverings and utensils to set up
housekeeping, one of the vehicles, and Mr. Mitchell's camping equipment and
guns. Mr. Mitchell was ordered to pay all of the marital debt, other than the
home mortgages. (R. at pp. 32-34)
3. At the time the original divorce was litigated, Mr. Mitchell was an
employee of Kennecott and was enrolled in its retirement benefits program.
These facts were well known to Mrs. Foulger. (Addendum no. 5)1
4. The parties' Decree of Divorce was later modified by Order dated
January 14, 1981. (R. at pp. 43-44)
5. The Order of modification made pursuant to Mrs. Foulger's required
an increase in child support and dealt with a life insurance issue. {Id.)
6. The Petitioner married John Foulger in 1984. (Addendum no. 5)
7. The Petitioner was later divorced from Mr. Foulger. (Id.)

1

As noted by the Appellant, Mr. Mitchell's memorandum in support of his
motion for a summary judgment, and his supporting affidavit, is not found in the
record. Mr. Mitchell's supporting memorandum is attached as an addendum to
this brief.
-4-

8. Mr. Mitchell is now retired and is receiving retirement benefits from
Kennecott. (Id.)
9. All of the parties'children have reached their majority. (Id.)
10. On or about January 29th, 2001, Mrs. Foulger filed the petition which
is now before the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce alleged that she was
now totally disabled and requested that the court modify the original divorce
decree to award her an interest in Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. (R. at pp.
45-50)
11. Counsel for Mr. Mitchell wrote to Mrs. Foulger's counsel, advising
him that this Court's ruling in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121
(Utah App. 1988), and in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990)
appeared to be controlling in this case. (Exhibit "E" to Appellee's Addendum,
attached hereto.)
12. On March 13th, 2001, Mr. Mitchell filed a motion for a summary
judgment, arguing that Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, was controlling in this case;
and that, accordingly, the petition to modify the divorce decree as requested by
Mrs. Foulger should be dismissed. (R. at pp. 58-59 and Appellee's Addendum.)
13. The motion for summary judgment was argued before Commissioner
Thomas N. Amett on April 26th, 2001, who recommended that Mr. Mitchell's
motion be granted. (R. at pp. 110, 134-35)
-5-

14. On July 17 , 2001, the trial court heard Mrs. Foulger's objection to the
Commissioner's recommendation, overruled it, and affirmed the entry of the
summary judgment. (R. at pp. 153-54)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly applied the undisputed material facts to Utah law,
as set forth in the cases of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah
App. 1988), and Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), and properly
granted Mr. Mitchell's motion for a summary judgment dismissing Mrs.
Foulger's petition to modify the parties' decree of divorce.
The doctrine of res judicata does apply to divorce proceedings despite the
continuing jurisdiction of Utah's district courts to modify divorce decrees upon
proof of significant changes in the divorced parties' circumstances. The doctrine
has been held to specifically apply with regard to claims made against retirement
benefits in divorce cases heard prior to the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the
case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
Utah law with regard to Mrs. Foulger's claim that she now be awarded a
share of Mr. Mitchell's retirement income was clearly defined prior to her filing
her petition to modify these parties' decree of divorce. She presents no new legal
argument or factual basis that is unique, or that sets the instant claim apart from
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similar claims for a distribution of retirement benefits earlier argued by other
parties to this Court. Mr. Mitchell should be awarded his costs and attorney fees.

ARGUMENT
I. THE GRANT OF THE MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS APPROPRIATE AS A MATTER OF LAW
Mrs. Foulger, in this action, is seeking to modify the decree of divorce
previously entered between herself and Mr. Mitchell to raise a property
distribution issue that could have been, and should have been, dealt with in the
original divorce proceeding. After Mrs. Foulger filed her petition, Mr. Mitchell
moved for a summary judgment, requesting that the petition be dismissed.
The grant of a summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that
no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Boyce ex rel Boyce v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, *f 18,
982 P.2d 565. Utah case law, applied to the undisputed facts in this case, did
establish, as a matter of law that Mr. Mitchell was entitled to the grant of a
summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition. This applicable case law
is found in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), and
in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr. Mitchell argued, and the trial court agreed, that this Court's earlier
decision in Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, which dealt directly with the very issue
-7-

presented in the instant case, was controlling and should be applied. Mrs. and
Mr. Throckmorton, the petitioner and appellant, respectfully, in that case
appealed the trial court's denial of Mrs. Throckmorton's request to modify the
Throckmorton's decree of divorce to grant to her one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's
retirement benefits.
The fact patterns and circumstances in Throckmorton, Id., and in the
instant case, are extremely similar. A comparison of the facts in the case now
before you with the facts in Throckmorton reveal marriages that had lasted many
years, that the parties' children from both marriages had reached their majority
at the time of the petitions to modify, that the respondents had both retired, and
that both of the petitioners; i.e., Mrs. Throckmorton and Mrs. Foulger, were
suffering medical problems not present at the time of the divorce, that Mrs.
Foulger was aware of the existence of her husband's retirement plan at the time
of the divorce, and that the original decrees of divorce were silent with regard to
the husbands' retirement benefits The only real difference in this case from
Throckmorton is that Mrs. Throckmorton was also seeking an alimony increase
(which she did receive), while in the instant case, Mrs. Foulger remarried shortly
after her divorce from Mr. Mitchell.
Mrs. Foulger made no effort in the trial court to distinguish Throckmorton,
767 P.2d 121, from the instant case. In her brief on appeal she argues for the first
-8-

time that Throckmorton is "clearly factually different." Mrs. Foulger argues that
her petition for a modification is based upon two alternative legal theories; which
are (1) that the asset was never addressed in the original proceeding, and (2) that
there is the existence of a very significant and life altering changes in her actual
needs. The problem with this argument is that the cases are not factually
different, and Mrs. Foulger's is seeking a share of Mr. Mitchell's pension
benefits. Both of these issues were, in fact, addressed by this Court's ruling in
Throckmorton.
The Court dealt squarely with the pension issue in its discussion of the
effect of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), in which the Utah
Supreme Court recognized pension benefits as marital assets. Mrs. Throckmorton
had argued that because at the time of her divorce Utah law did not recognize
pension benefits as a marital asset that Woodward should be given retroactive
effect. The Court of Appeals refused to give Woodward retroactive effect
recognizing the compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property
settlements. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124. As in Throckmorton, the Mitchell
divorce was entered prior to the Woodward decision.
In a more recent case that is also on point, Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713
(Utah App. 1990), this Court looked again at a petition to modify a decree of
divorce seeking a distribution of the ex-husband's retirement account. The ex-9-

wife in Ostler claimed that she was not aware of the retirement benefits at the
time the divorce was prosecuted. This Court, consistent with the Throckmorton
decision, affirmed the trial court's decision to not modify the decree of divorce
to include a distribution of the retirement account. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715. This
Court also refused once again to make Woodward retroactive, holding that Mrs.
Ostler's claim of lack of knowledge regarding the retirement benefits did not
constitute the requisite change of circumstances necessary to modify her decree
of divorce. Id. Nevertheless, it appears to be Mrs. Foulger's argument that
despite the Court's clear ruling in Throckmorton and in Ostler that the principles
of Woodward should be applied. This is clearly not the status of the current case
law.
Mrs. Foulger argues that the granting of Mr. Mitchell's motion was
premature inasmuch as discovery was incomplete or ongoing. However, motions
for summary judgment may be brought at any time and are not necessarily subject
to the constraints of case management orders or Ut. R. Civ. P. 26. Mrs. Mitchell
could have, pursuant to the provisions of Ut. R. Civ. P. 56 (f), sought a
continuance to take additional discovery, but chose to do so. Such discovery was
unnecessary in any event. Even assuming that Mrs. Foulger's physical infirmities
are present, such does not alter the effect of the law as applied to the instant
undisputed facts
-10-

The affidavits and pleadings that were before the trial court were sufficient
to establish that no genuine issues of material fact existed which would preclude
the granting of Mr. Mitchell's motion as a matter of law.
Both the lower court's domestic relations commissioner, Commissioner
Thomas Arnett, Jr., and the trial court judge, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck,
recognized that Throckmorton and Ostler were controlling in light of the
undisputed facts and, accordingly, granted Mr. Mitchell's motion for the grant of
a summary judgment.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IS
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
The state of the law in Utah in 1977, when the Mitchell's Decree of
Divorce was granted, did not require the specific division of retirement benefits
as a separate category of marital property. It wasn't until 1982 that the Utah
Supreme Court first recognized pension benefits as a marital asset. Woodward
v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

However, as discussed above

Woodward was not given retroactive effect. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124;
Ostler, 789P.2dat715.
This Court did note, of course, how the application of the doctrine of res
judicata is unique in divorce actions because of that equitable doctrine which
allows courts to reopen the case on a demonstration that there is a substantial
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change of circumstances. On this point this Court in Throckmorton made
reference to Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985), in which it was
held that in order to modify a prior property award the moving party must
establish a substantial change of circumstances which was not within the original
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the original decree was
rendered. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed in Throckmorton the trial
court's ruling denying Mrs. Throckmorton an interest in Mr. Throckmorton's
retirement benefits as there had been a fair opportunity to have the issue
determined in the original proceeding."
This Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the doctrine of
res judicata applies to divorce proceedings. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d at 123. In
so holding, this Court quoted from Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah
1985), "When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those
issues which were determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair
opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding."
As in Throckmorton, the issue of Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefit plan
was well within these parties' contemplation at the time the original divorce was
2

This Court noted that allowing Mr. Throckmorton to keep his retirement
benefits considering the totality of the original property distribution did not
offend the Court's sense of justice as Mr. Throckmorton, under the original
decree was ordered to pay $12,000 in marital debts while Mrs. Throckmorton was
- 12-

litigated.

Mrs. Foulger cannot establish the requisite substantial change of

circumstances.
Utah Code Annotated may provide for modifications based upon
substantial material changes in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce, but this is clearly not without limits. In this case Mr. Mitchell's
retirement benefits were well within the contemplation of the parties'. Mrs.
Foulger could have dealt with the issue at the time of the original litigation.
The issues raised in the modification petition are res judicata. This is
clearly established by case law. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 123.
III.

MR. MITCHELL SHOULD BE AWARDED
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Mr. Mitchell is entitled to an award of his costs and a reasonable attorney's
fee. Prior to her filing the instant Petition, Mr. Mitchell's attorney was contacted
by Mrs. Foulger's attorney requesting information on any specific law or facts
that would suggest that Mrs. Foulger would not now be entitled to a division of
Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. In response, Mr. Mitchell's attorney wrote
back to Mrs. Foulger's attorney. In this correspondence specific reference was
made to both the Throckmorton and Ostler cases. Cites to both cases were
provided. In light of this, Mrs. Foulger had adequate opportunity to consider the

awarded the family home and ultimately received $24,000 in equity in that home.
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propriety of proceeding with her Petition. Despite the clear similarity of the fact
patterns presented and the case law being on point, she nevertheless proceeded
with the her petition to modify the divorce decree.
Mr. Mitchell requested that the trial court award him his costs and attorney
fees incurred in defending against Mrs. Foulger's claims. The Commissioner
declined to make this award. Believing that the matter was resolved based upon
the clear status of the case law, he did not pursue this claim. However, it is now
appropriate, based upon the instant appeal, that he be awarded his costs and a
reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to the provisions of rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an award of attorney fees if the
appeal is frivolous.

A frivolous appeal has application in cases with no

"reasonable legal or factual basis". Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App. 110, f 14, see
also, Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). Mr. Mitchell
submits that there is no legal or factual basis for Mrs. Foulger's appeal.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that there were no disputed issues of
material fact and that Mr. Mitchell was entitled to a summary judgment
dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition for modification as a matter of law. This
Appellee respectfully requests that following its review of the trial court's grant
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of summary judgment for correctness, e\en gi\ ing no particular deference to its
conclusions of law, that this Court find that the trial court did not err in appK ing
the governing law to the undisputed issues of material fact and that it affirm the
grant of summary judgment.
Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court grant him his costs and
attorney fees, or, in the alternative, remand the case to the District Court directing
it to make the award.
DATED this < ) / 5 i day of January, 2002.

Douglas T. Hall
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellee's Brief was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this g | 5 ^ day of
January, 2002, to the following:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
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DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305)
Attorney for Respondent
4885 South. 900 East. Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
Telephone 801-259-5000
Facsimile 801-263-1426

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RUTH LEILA MITCHELL, aka RUTH
FOULGER,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

;|
|
|
|
i

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. D-26438

DONALD R. MITCHELL,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

Defendant/Respondent.

COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through counsel, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, and submits the following
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his motion for a Summary Judgment in
his favor dismissing the Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, and for an award of a
reasonable attorney's fee and his costs incurred herein.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. These parties were divorced on October 3, 1977. A copy of the Decree of Divorce
(the ^Decree") is attached hereto as Exhibit UA", and by reference is incorporated herein.
2. At the time the original divorce was litigated, Mr. Mitchell was an employee of
Kennecott and was enrolled in its retirement benefits program. These facts were well known

- 1 .

to Mrs. Folger. Affidavit of Donald R. Mitchell, paragraph 4, Mr. Mitchell*s affidavit is
attached hereto as Exhibit WTT and by reference incorporated herein.
3. The Decree was later modified by Order dated January 14, 1981. A copy of the
Order modifying the Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit "C\

and by reference is

incorporated herein.
4. The Order of modification required an increase in child support and dealt with life
insurance issues. Id.
5. The Petitioner married John Folger in 1984. Mitchell affidavit at paragraph 5.
6. The Petitioner is since divorced from her husband. Id. at paragraph 6.
7. Mr. Mitchell is now retired and is receiving retirement benefits from Kennecott.
Id. at paragraph 7.
8. All of the parties' children have reached their majority. Id. at paragraph 8.
ARGUMENT
I
The grant of a summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Boyce ex rel. Boyce v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, t 18, 982 P.2d 565.
The undisputed material facts show that the petitioner, Mrs. Folger, is now seeking to
modify the Decree of Divorce to raise a property distribution issue that could have been, and
should have been, dealt with in the original divorce proceeding.
The Utah Court of Appeals has earlier dealt directly with the very issue presented in
the instant case. In Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), the
petitioner in that case, Mrs. Throckmorton, appealed the trial court's denial of her request to
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modify the Throckmorton's decree of divorce to grant to her one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's
retirement benefits. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the
doctrine of res judicata applies to divorce proceedings.

Id. at p. 123.

(A copy of

Throckmorton is at Exhibit *TT.) In so holding, the Court of Appeals quoted from Jacobsen
v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985), "When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res
judicata as to those issues which were determined, or upon all issues which the party had a
fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding."
The factual circumstances in Throckmorton and in the instant case are very similar. A
comparison of the facts in the instant case with the facts in Throckmorton reveal marriages
that had lasted many years, that the parties' children from both marriages had reached their
majority at the time of the petitions to modify, that the respondents had both retired, and that
both of the petitioners were suffering medical problems. And, as in Throckmorton, Mrs.
Folger knew of Mr. Mitchell's retirement program with Kennecott. The only real difference
in the case is that Mrs. Throckmorton was also seeking an alimony increase (which she did
receive), while in the instant case, Mrs. Folger remarried shortly after her divorce from Mr.
Mitchell.
The Court of Appeals did note how the application of the doctrine of res judicata is
unique in divorce actions because of that equitable doctrine which allows courts to reopen the
case on a demonstration that there is a substantial change of circumstances. On this point, the
Appellate Court made reference to Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985), in
which it was held that in order to modify a prior property award the moving party must
establish a substantial change of circumstances which was not within the original
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the original decree was rendered.

- j
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Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling denying Mrs. Throckmorton
an interest in Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits as there had been a fair opportunity to
have the issue determined in the original proceeding. As in Throckmorton, the issue of Mr.
Mitchell's retirement benefit plan was well within these parties' contemplation at the time the
original divorce was litigated.

Mrs. Folger cannot establish the requisite substantial change

of circumstances.
The Court of Appeals also discussed the effect of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431 (Utah 1982), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized pension benefits as marital
assets. Mrs. Throckmorton had argued that because at the time of her divorce Utah law did
not recognize pension benefits as a marital asset, Woodward should be given retroactive
effect. The Court of Appeals refused to give Woodward retroactive effect recognizing the
compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property settlements. Throckmorton at p.
124. The instant divorce was entered prior to the Woodward decision.
In a more recent case, Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), the Court of
Appeals looked again at a petition to modify a decree of divorce seeking a distribution of the
ex-husband's retirement account. The ex-wife in Osterler claimed that she was not aware of
the retirement benefits at the time the divorce was prosecuted.

The Court of Appeals,

consistent with the Throckmorton decision, affirmed the trial court's decision to not modify
the decree of divorce to include a distribution of the retirement account.
The Court of Appeals in Ostler referenced the Throckmorton case. It again refused to
make Woodward retroactive and held that Mrs. Ostler's claim of lack of knowledge regarding
the retirement benefits did not constitute the requisite change of circumstances necessary to
modify her decree of divorce. Ostler, supra.
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II
Mr. Mitchell is entitled to an award of his costs and a reasonable attorneys fee. Prior
to her filing the instant Petition, Mr. Mitchell's attorney was contacted by Mrs. Foiger's
attorney requesting information on any specific law or facts that would suggest that Mrs.
Foiger would not now be entitled to a division of Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. In
response, Mr. Mitchell's attorney wrote back to Mrs. Foiger's attorney making reference to
both Throckmorton and Ostler and providing the cites to both cases. A copy of Mr. Hall's
letter to Mr. Jackson is attached at Exhibit UE" and by reference is incorporated herein. In
light of this, Mrs. Foiger had adequate opportunity to consider the propriety of proceeding
with the Petition. Despite the clear similarity of facts presented and the case law being on
point, she nevertheless proceeded with the instant Petition.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Foiger had the opportunity to litigate the issue of Mr. Mitchell's retirement
benefits at the time of the divorce. Since she failed to do so, her claim is barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.

In addition, case law, lends full support to this conclusion. Mr.

Mitchell prays this Court to grant the instant motion for a summary judgment to dismiss Mrs.
Foiger's petition to modify the decree of divorce to grant her an interest in his retirement
benefits and to award him his cost incurred herein along with a reasonable attorney's fee.
DATED this / g # day of March, 2001.

Douglas T. Hall
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed.
first class postage pre-paid, this
tan

day of March. 2001. to the following:

W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111-2379
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DOUGLAS T. HALL
ATTORNEY AT

LAW

Facsimile
801-263-1426

In Utah County
801-756-7831
4885 South, 900 East, Suite 208, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
Telephone 801-259-5000

January 23, 2001

W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Mitchell (Folger) v. Mitchell

Dear Mr. Jackson:
I do not believe that your client is entitled to a portion of Mr. Mitchell's
retirement benefits. Not only did Mrs. Folger remarry shortly after her divorce
from Mr. Mitchell, but there was adequate opportunity to raise the issue of a
distribution of retirement benefits at the time the original decree of divorce was
being heard. I invite your attention to Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P,2d
121 (Utah App. 1988), and the more recent case of Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713
(Utah App. 1990). I believe that the "policy interest favoring the finality of
property settlements^, Oster, supra, is applicable in this case.
Very truly yours,

iA

Douglas T. Hall
DTH/jr
cc: Don Mitchell
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